History through the eyes of a 14th century Arab

Part #0. Introduction.

Today I invite you to look at history through the eyes of Abu Zeid Abdurrahman ibn Muhammad al-Hadrami, better known as Ibn Khaldun.

He was an extraordinary person, who during his life managed to be close to the rulers of many different states. The geography of his workplaces can be judged, in particular, by the following facts:

· It was he who, on behalf of the Emir of Granada, negotiated peace with Pedro of Castile,

· He held high positions at the court of the Sultan of Tunisia,

· Was a clerk at the court of the Sultan of Fez,

· Conducted negotiations between the Egyptian Sultan and Tamerlane,

· He held the position of supreme qadi (supreme judge) of the Malikis many times.

What remained from him were poems, letters and four treatises that came out of his hands, combined into one cycle called “The Book of Edification on the History of the Arabs, Persians and Berbers and their contemporaries, who had great power.”

The most famous of these treatises is the so-called “Mukaddimah”, that is, “Introduction on the superiority of the science of history.” This book is studied as part of the “History of Economic Doctrines”, since in it he largely anticipated the thoughts of Adam Smith, and the so-called “Keynesianism”, and many other “discoveries” of Western economic thought of the 18th-20th centuries. It is also studied as a valuable source on the history of North Africa in particular and the Arab world in general.

At the same time, other works and other aspects of Ibn Khaldun’s treatises are deliberately or accidentally hushed up, mentioned extremely rarely or overly simplistic. Especially those that are devoted to the topic of power: where power comes from, how this or that group comes to power, for what reason this power group is eroded and ultimately loses power.

But it is precisely these parts of Ibn Khaldun’s works that are considered the most valuable among many Western and domestic practicing political strategists. They regard the works of this Arab on questions of power as no less significant than the works of Newton for the development of physics, Darwin on questions of biology, Aristotle on questions of philosophy and Avicenna on questions of medicine.

But questions about the nature of power are very subtle questions. The authorities themselves are not interested in making the answers to such questions public. It is interesting to propose instead simulacra that in one way or another sacralize power. And here there are no fundamental differences between sacralization through the divinity of power, or sacralization through “democratic procedures.”

Part #1. Asabiya

“Before we unite, and in order to unite, we must first resolutely and definitely separate ourselves.”

V. I. Lenin.

Analyzing what exactly is the main cause of power – what usually becomes the main reason that this or that group of people achieves a dominant position – Ibn Khaldun came to the unequivocal conclusion that it is “asabiya”.

Only when an association of people has a “much stronger asabiya” than the current authorities is it able to effectively resist them. Despite the fact that at the start, this association, as a rule, has much fewer resources and capabilities than the current government.

So what kind of “asabiya” is this?

This is an Arabic word, which is most accurately translated into Russian as “cohesion.” This is collective solidarity, which is filled with what Gumilyov calls passionarity – that is, courage, inspiration, fortitude, the power of justice, a sense of one’s own rightness. That is, we are talking not just about the unity of the people of this group, but about active, aggressive, militant unity, filled with both a readiness to use violence and a readiness for self-sacrifice.

Such unity cannot fully arise at the level of rational thinking. Just as it cannot arise at the level of what is commonly called “interests,” that is, at the level of various kinds of base desires. However, even this incomplete level of “asabiyya” can be higher than that of the current power group, and therefore can ultimately ensure success for the applicants.

The full level of “asabiyya” can arise only when the Idea arises. The idea must be religious or quasi-religious – that is, answering basic philosophical and moral questions: about justice, about the purpose of human life, about what the future should be. Only ideas of this magnitude can capture not only people’s thoughts, but also their spirit. Only such ideas are capable of ensuring the highest level of internal militant cohesion.

This leads to a conclusion that fully corresponds to the above quote from V.I. Lenin:

A smaller group, but more united and more ready for violence, is significantly preferable to a larger group that is less solid and less ready for aggression and self-sacrifice.

Another important point is that during this stage, leadership within the group is provided not by mechanisms of dominance, but by mechanisms of respect. The leader of a group with high “asabiya” is the member who receives the highest respect among the group members. And the highest respect is most often received by the person who, as it seems to the group members, either declares and interprets the Idea better than others, or puts this very Idea on the altar more than others.

At the same time, a group with strong asabiya is perceived by other people as a group with strong vitality, high passionarity, and a high level of vital energy. Its representatives are psychologically perceived as real leaders, as real leaders. This leads to the fact that such a group is capable, in conditions of uncertainty, of infecting with its ideas and attracting the broad masses to its side. In favorable conditions, this allows you to completely turn the situation around human and other resources in your favor in a relatively short time.

Ibn Khaldun finds the highest level of asabiyya in those people who live a harsh life full of danger. And the least is among the city dwellers, that is, among people corrupted by overconsumption (consumption in excess of what is necessary).

In the case of northern Africa, such harsh people were primarily either Bedouins or mercenary soldiers.

Part #2. Davla

“Better one bad general than two good ones.”

Napoleon Bonaparte

What happens after a tightly knit aggressive group (possessing high asabiyyah) comes to power?

According to Ibn Khaldun, “dawla” is happening – that is, “accelerated movement”, which leads to the destruction of the once united cohesive group, the emergence in place of control through respect, control through domination.

Firstly, it quickly becomes clear that the Idea is quite far removed from real life and real problems. Everyone had a common opinion, while it was purely theoretical. But, when it comes to practical implementation in specific conditions, it turns out that different members of the group that came to power see this very implementation differently.

Secondly, it quickly becomes clear that Napoleon Bonaparte was right in his quote: one bad general is better than two good ones – because when two people make decisions, decisions often turn out to be inconsistent and multidirectional.

Thirdly, not all people from the group that came to power turn out to be equally effective managers. But usually, ineffective people expect that, because of their past achievements, they will be treated in the same way as effective people: with the same level of respect, and their words being listened to in the same way.

Fourthly, some people even want to enjoy all the benefits of the status of winners, but at the same time take on minimal responsibility for further events.

As a result, even if the group that has come to power tries to preserve the principles of collective, collegial decision-making, according to the same patterns by which they could be made at the stages before they received power, this usually leads to an extremely low level of management.

Therefore, sooner or later, in order to achieve an acceptable level of control over the situation, the once united community of the group that came to power is destroyed.

“Mulk” begins to build, another Arabic term that literally means “possession.” And Ibn Khaldun has hierarchical management based on the principle of dominance.

That is:

· those members of the once united group that seized power who are either ineffective as managers or whose expectations do not correspond to the role assigned to them are excluded from the power vertical.

· those who were not part of the group that seized power, but who turn out to be valuable either as managers or for strengthening the power of the new top of the hierarchy, are included in the power vertical.

Part #3. Making a Mulk

“Power is not for those who created it, and glory is not for those who obtained it.”

Ibn Khaldun

The Arabic word “mulk” is translated into Russian as “Possession”.

Ibn Khaldun himself by “mulk” means a hierarchical state with a clear vertical, in which control through respect is gradually increasingly replaced by control through domination – through the use of power mechanisms of this very vertical.

The creation of such a management model seems inevitable to Ibn Khaldun, since only it allows for effective management.

But it also inevitably breeds discontent among many who were once part of the single group that seized power and now feel left out. After all, previously someone was the first among equals, and perhaps not even the first – and now he is trying to build a “suzerain-vassal” relationship with the others instead of “brotherly relations”, dragging the final decision-making onto himself. It is easy to understand that this is very offensive by human standards.

At the same time, the new ruler, or the new thinned-out power group that finds itself at the very top, is itself the bearer of the same spirit of militant unity and understands:

· what is asabiyyah

· how does it arise

· what danger does the emergence of a group with high asabiyya pose in the country for the new government?

According to Ibn Khaldun this leads to:

· persecution of those members of the once united power group who have the strongest manifestation of this most militant unity, but did not make it to the top of the new management pyramid. Because it is obvious that these are the people who can become the core of a new small cohesive group capable of overthrowing the emerging government.

· promotion to the top of those people who were not part of the group that came to power, and perhaps even fought against it. These people become the support of the new rulers in relation to the possible opportunism of the former “brothers”. But since they are often ideologically not so close to the new authorities, this leads to a drop in the level of asabiyya at the top of the power pyramid.

· Actions aimed at preventing the emergence of new groups with high asabiyya. Namely:

1. Finding “protruding spikes” – that is, increased attention to those people who can become leaders of protest groups. They either need to be promoted to the top to keep them happy. Or, on the contrary, “cut off”.

2. Control over any societies, clubs, meetings. After all, these are places in which a narrow group with high internal militant cohesion can arise. Therefore, an analysis and preventive destruction of those gatherings is carried out where there is a great danger of the emergence of communities with high asabiyyah.

3. Expanding the network of informants and creating an atmosphere of mutual distrust in society as a whole, so that even if a group with high asabiyyah arose somewhere, it would be difficult for it to expand (recruit new members) – so that this group could be easily discovered at the stage while it is small.

4. Depriving people of political energy by increasing their workload with other matters.

Part #4. The heyday of the mulk is a period of ostentatious prosperity.

“During a safe voyage, be especially mindful of the storm.”

St. Gregory the Theologian, 16, 210.

Gradually, those people who were burning with the Idea, who were part of that united and militant group that seized power, are leaving power.

At the same time, the number of sincere supporters of the Idea is also decreasing on other levels of the hierarchy. Since at all previous stages such people were perceived by the authorities in many ways as a threat, and for career growth, competence and loyalty were valued, rather than ideological coherence of positions.

All this leads to the general decline of the Idea. There is nowhere to find people who share the previous Idea in its entirety, in sufficient numbers to replace people leaving the power vertical. There is nowhere to find people who sincerely want to promote this Idea to the masses, to replace the outgoing agitators.

As a result, power is increasingly transferred to people who do not share the same original Idea. And below there are fewer and fewer people who sincerely “believe” – because people there have also already realized that sincere support of the Idea generates for them more dangers than rewards.

All this leads to the fact that power can rely less and less on the Idea. Less and less can justify that its actions are successful because they correspond to the Idea, that they help to achieve the situation that the Idea declares as desirable.

This leads to the fact that the Idea begins to be replaced by some more primitive simulacra. For example:

· an increase in the level of consumed goods for all those people on whom the stability of power depends. That is, primarily for those who are at the top of the pyramid.

· an increase in the number of acts that symbolically demonstrate the power of the state – construction, monuments, events.

Because of these two groups of external attributes, it is often at this stage that the state from the outside appears to be the healthiest, the strongest, the most prosperous. While in fact this is already a situation of a disguised crisis.

Part #5. Stagnation.

“The soul fades without vigorous blood circulation, and the blood stagnates without the activity of the soul.”

Evgeniy Vitalievich Antonyuk

At this stage, the original Idea completely disappears from the system.

People at the top of the power pyramid are finally losing their ideological support and practically losing their internal collective cohesion.

They understand that they no longer have any support other than the existing power vertical. And therefore they begin to be afraid to touch it – after all, the taller a person is, the more resources he has. And more risks arise when trying to infringe on such a person in anything.

As a result, the promotion of people to the top for efficiency begins to disappear: all the places at the top are already occupied: “The general has his own son.” And the punishment for ineffectiveness practically disappears: the more power someone has, the more dangerous it is to touch him, even if he is ineffective – it is much safer in the short term to find the switchman and turn a blind eye to the problems that arise.

If in the first stages of the reign of the current power group, an increased level of consumption and level of advancement in power were given for significant steps that helped achieve the Idea. If then, buns were given out for success in the field of administration. At this stage, obviously, everything is turned upside down. A high level of consumption finally becomes a demonstration of the level of power. The higher the level of power you have in the system, the higher the level of consumption available to you. And even more than that: the higher you are in the pyramid of real power, the more you are obliged to demonstrate an increasingly higher level of consumption, otherwise others will perceive you as a weak link, as someone who actually has less power than it seems at first glance. And they will want to reduce your level of power to your level of consumption.

It is not surprising that the main task for the authorities at this stage is to simply try to maintain the efficiency of the system at least at the same level, at least to reduce the rate of its degradation. This is postulated as the task of maintaining stability – “so that everything goes on as always.”

But in fact, as this process progresses, erosion inevitably continues to increase.

At the top of the system, “asabiya” – militant collective cohesion – is increasingly weakened. There is no time, no one and no one to show it to.

And the efficiency of the management system is decreasing more and more. On all floors. And the authorities are losing hope of doing anything about it. Any changes are limited by so many factors that they practically do not increase efficiency.

As a result, power groups become unprepared and almost incapable of real confrontation with external enemies.

Realizing their inner weakness, they are ready to surrender at the slightest external pressure, hoping that those who betray their colleagues first will then be able to take higher places in the new system of power, under new masters.

The habit of a luxurious life naturally, especially with the change of generations, leads to a shift in motivation to maintain the achieved level and quality of life at all costs. The thirst for peace “softens” the soul and reduces the level of “asabiyyah”. In addition, since the luxury and peace of rulers directly depend on maintaining power, the desire to preserve it at any cost becomes dominant. Not only the interests of the ordinary population, but even the stability of society and the state itself are subject to similar motives at this stage.

In addition, at this stage it becomes noticeable that the system has largely lost the ability to control the emergence and growth of internal groups with high militant collective cohesion within society. In fact, this very control was declining already at the stage of the period of ostentatious prosperity. But then competitive internal passionary groups existed mainly in a form hidden from the masses. But during the period of Stagnation, the results become obvious to everyone who has eyes and ears: in society, and primarily among the elites, individual groups united within themselves, sharing only their own, internal ideas and goals of the state, contradictory to the general course of the state, become increasingly noticeable.

But the problem is that these same groups, especially those within the elite, often have asabiya at a fairly low level. They unite on the basis of desires, interests, rational thoughts, and not deep ideas. And therefore, the rise of such groups to power is not able to stop the overall picture of the decline of the state.

Part #6. Collapse.

“This city is wrapped like a shroud in fog,

And madness, vice and deception reign in him,

A city of dark slums, all eaten up by evil,

At night the darkness covers him like a wing,

And the night looks into the eye sockets of houses, like a raven,

This city is immaculately black.”

The King and the Jester

If the power group did not have time to fall at the previous stage under the blows of external enemies or internal groups possessing a truly high degree of collective militant cohesion, a stage of complete decadence begins.

Those at the top of the power pyramid cease to be interested in almost everything except extravagance, embezzlement and madness. That is, everything except maximizing your own pleasures.

At this stage, all kinds of palace coups, riots, and enemy invasions inevitably begin. And, sooner or later, the weakened state will come to an end. Or a new elite group, possessing high asabiyya – high collective militant cohesion, nevertheless comes to power. And then the cycle begins again.

According to Ibn Khaldun, it is impossible to prevent such a development of events. Later political thinkers tried to come up with ways out of this cycle – but if I write about it, it will definitely not be in this article.

Part #7. Afterword.

One of the greatest mysteries in history is the half-forgotten Eastern European culture of Cucuteni-Trypillia. For scientists, the most fascinating mystery of this 7,000-year-old civilization was why they burned their vast settlements to the ground every 60-80 years. The Trypillians built a beautiful city, and then destroyed it, moved a little further and built another one just like it, so that decades later they would repeat it all again…

According to Ibn Khaldun's statistics, the average lifespan of dynasties in the Arab world was just over 100 years (sample of 41 dynasties).

Moreover, most often the reign of the dynasty ranged from 76 to 100 years.

The USSR, by the way, lasted just under 75.

Author: Alexander Pismenyuk

Original