NASA facilities are some of the worst they've ever seen, experts say

Johnson Space Center Houston's buildings are among the worst of any NASA facility.

A panel of independent experts said this week that NASA lacks the funds to maintain most of its decades-old facilities, that it is at risk of losing its engineering skills to the commercial space industry and that it has a short-sighted technology road map.

“NASA's problem is that it always has $3 billion more programs than funds,” said Norm Augustine, chairman of a National Academy of Sciences panel tasked with studying the critical facilities, workforce and technologies needed to achieve long-term strategic goals and NASA tasks. A similar statement could be subsumed under two previous high-level reviews of NASA's space programs, which he led in 1990 and 2009, Augustine said. But a report released Tuesday described NASA's predicament in harsh terms.

Destructive comments about crumbling infrastructure

About 83 percent of NASA facilities have reached their design life, and the agency is behind $3.3 billion in maintenance. Given that NASA spends $250 million on normal annual maintenance, NASA's annual infrastructure repair budget would need to increase by $600 million to catch up over the next 10 years.

For members of Congress or the White House, supporting a new NASA mission to the Moon or a space telescope to explore the deepest reaches of the Universe is often more attractive than investing in maintaining the facilities. Early initiatives attract public attention and create jobs. Most NASA facilities across the country are in “unsightly to deplorable” condition, according to a presentation last year by Eric Weiser, NASA's director of facilities and real estate, for the National Academies.

“In NASA’s case, the frequent tendency, under budget constraints, to prioritize launching new missions rather than maintaining and modernizing existing support assets has resulted in the creation of infrastructure that would not be considered acceptable by most industry standards,” the panel wrote in its report. “In fact, during its inspection tours, the committee saw some of the worst facilities many of its members had ever seen.”

“NASA's mission budget has grown 8 percent since 2010,” Augustine said. “At the same time, the mission support budget was reduced by 33 percent. If you do a little math, every dollar in the mission support budget today is 50 percent more than it was in 2010, not that long ago.”

NASA is addressing infrastructure shortages at a time when the agency is pursuing the most challenging missions in its 66-year history.

“In terms of both architectural and technical complexity, NASA today—for example, with the Artemis program to land on the Moon in a few years—is tackling challenges that far exceed those faced by the Apollo program,” Augustine said.

All NASA centers have facilities the agency considers non-essential, but Johnson Space Center in Houston has facilities with the worst average score. Johnson trains astronauts and is home to NASA's Mission Control Center for the International Space Station and future Artemis lunar missions. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California, which develops and operates many of NASA's robotic interplanetary probes, and the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi, used for rocket engine testing, are the only centers without a low score for infrastructure.

These ratings cover things like buildings and utilities, not specific test benches or the instruments found within them. “You can have a world-class microscope and materials laboratory, but if the building collapses, the microscope will be useless,” Weiser told a National Academy of Sciences panel meeting last year.

The panel recommended that Congress direct NASA to establish an annually replenished revolving working capital fund to pay for infrastructure maintenance and upgrades. Other government agencies use similar funds to support infrastructure. “This is something that will require federal legislation,” says Jill Dahlburg, a member of the National Academy of Sciences panel and former head of the space science division at the Naval Research Laboratory.

Long-term planning

The panel also concluded that NASA does not have a specific long-term strategy that would ensure the development of the right technologies needed for future missions. In meetings with agency staff, “we often heard comments that there was no point in trying to do long-term planning at an organization like NASA,” Augustine said. “Our committee does not agree with this.”

The federal government operates on annual budget cycles, and overall government spending plans are released only once every five years. This does not match the time it takes NASA to take its missions from concept to completion. “NASA's operations, its missions, typically involve decades of work, or at least one decade of work,” Augustine said.

While NASA officials can't do anything about the federal budget process, a panel of experts called on the agency to set deadlines for critical technologies and prioritize technology development.

Ed Crowley, a professor in MIT's engineering department, said the panel identified 10 types of technologies that NASA and its contractors should develop to achieve the agency's goal of a sustainable human presence on the Moon and future crewed expeditions to Mars. The most important, according to Crowley, are cosmic energy and propulsion for moving large masses around the Earth, Moon and Mars; technologies for entry, descent and landing of spacecraft on the Red Planet; as well as radiation safety for people.

“I call them the three wonders we need to get to Mars,” Crowley said. “Some progress has been made over the last decade… but there is still a lot of work ahead, and each of them can be viewed as a relatively expensive stand-alone project that must be integrated into a larger mission package.”

Competition for the best

The commissioners also noted concerns among NASA employees that increasing dependence on commercial partners could lead to the deskilling of agency personnel. The committee acknowledged the success of NASA's commercial cargo and crew transportation programs, which rely on fixed-price service contracts, but warned that overreliance on such contracts forces NASA employees into supervisory roles rather than hands-on engineering work.

As a result, NASA risks losing its most talented engineers, who could move to companies for more lucrative and higher-paying jobs. “Very few of the nation’s most innovative scientists and engineers are likely to seek or remain in such purely supervisory positions,” the commission wrote.

“I think the committee unanimously believes that the future of the United States will be better served if NASA retains its engineering prowess and the agency does not become a funding gateway or contract watchdog,” said Kathy Sullivan, a retired space shuttle astronaut and former NOAA administrator. .

NASA's commercial partners often rely on the agency's technical expertise and capabilities. SpaceX launches rockets from a NASA-owned launch pad, tests its first Crew Dragon spacecraft in NASA's vacuum chamber, and relies on NASA experts to develop Dragon and its astronaut training program. NASA has entered into many agreements with other commercial companies to provide expertise and assistance.

“Industry really appreciates having an agency like NASA that understands something about technology and doesn't just sit around and hand out dollars,” says Lester Lyles, a retired Air Force general.

Hans Koenigsmann, SpaceX's former vice president of assembly and flight reliability, said NASA's use of service contracts, such as the agreement with SpaceX to transport crews and cargo, has led to “amazing progress… But it also forces some NASA employees a little bit worried about my future and how much hands-on work NASA will be doing in the future.”

The panel recommended that NASA establish specific criteria for fixed-price service contracts to avoid the use of such agreements in programs with immature technologies in the early stages. “Problems with such contracts arise where inventions, significant developments, unique situations, or uncertain requirements are involved,” the commission wrote.

NASA is using fixed-price contracts with SpaceX and Blue Origin to develop a human landing system as part of the Artemis program. Human-crewed landers will transport astronauts between lunar orbit and the lunar surface. SpaceX will provide a version of its powerful Starship rocket as a lunar lander, and Blue Origin is working on its own system called Blue Moon.

“Given the complexity of this task, it is likely that the full capabilities of NASA and contractors will be required to ensure the success of a national program of this complexity and importance,” the National Academy of Sciences panel report said.