How the first onboard computers were created for the Soviet space program
With the development of astronautics, the question arose more and more acutely before the designers – and with the help of what to control the space “pegasus” of the future conquerors of space-time? Where to get a suitable computer that will successfully operate in the cramped conditions of a spacecraft (SC)? How to protect fine equipment from overloads, possible overheating? In the end, how much energy is required for a potential on-board digital computer (DCVM) and where can this energy be obtained?
The questions, I must say, are not idle. For the “ground” computers available at that time somehow did not really fit into the concept of the future on-board computer – compact, reliable and economical.
Nevertheless, there was something. Soviet science and technology in the 50s were able to introduce into production (albeit small-scale) a whole range of computers. And some of them, at the time of their appearance, turned out to be quite, as they say, “on the level”. For example, in 1953 it was recognized that the workers ‘and peasants’ BESM is the fastest computer in Europe. Work was constantly carried out to improve and reduce the cost of this machine without losing performance. Already at BESM-2, the calculation of the flight path to the moon was made.
High-speed electronic calculating machine BESM. Power consumption: 35 kW
In addition, there were such machines as the Ural. They were classified as a small class. With productivity approaching 100 ops / sec, the Urals were also in demand in the space industry. For example, they were used to calculate the flight of the first satellite. By 1959, they were “accelerated” 50 times, using RAM on ferrite cores. True, at the same time partially sacrificing compatibility with earlier machines of the series.
However, the Ural computers, although considered small, required tens of square meters of area and from 10 to 25 kW of power consumption. What can we say about the monstrous BESM! There was no question of using them as an on-board computer. Nevertheless, they fully allowed future technology to calculate.
Small automatic electronic computer “Ural-1”. Power consumption 10 kW.
In the second half of the 50s, under the leadership of S.P. Korolev, OKB-1 employed about two thousand specialists. Among them were representatives of rather exotic directions, including those who had a chance to work in the notorious city of Obninsk. This was the first serious work of the young “electronics engineers” of OKB-1. They, still recent students, had to practically create from scratch a lot of equipment for the control and protection system of experimental reactors, incl. in the core. In addition, it was in Obninsk that semiconductor triodes were first widely used. This experience was very useful for solving “space” problems.
These tasks were corrected many times. For example, at the end of 1958, the team was instructed to ensure the successful flight of a satellite with a person on board. When calculations and surveys in this direction were in full swing, everything, lights out, in the fall of 60th you have to fly to Mars!
Did you realize at the “top” the scale of the work that needed to be carried out to implement such a huge amount of plans? It is hard to say. But in OKB-1, it became finally clear that it was time to leave the radio-technical methods of spacecraft control in the past. Korolev set the task of Boris Chertok’s group to develop an appropriate control system. To take off.
By that time, Chertok was already an outstanding specialist in the development of missile control systems. He worked in this direction at least since 1946, when he returned from Germany after studying the reactive “legacy” of the Third Reich. Well, after his group was reinforced by six dozen specialists who had shortly before ensured the success of the Luna-3 mission, there was every reason to seriously hope for success.
Boris Viktorovich Rauschenbach
Boris Rauschenbach supervised the “lunar” works. And it is not surprising that it was he who was instructed to deal with the guidance and orientation system in the space of the future first interplanetary spacecraft “Mars-1960”, aka 1M. In turn, by personal decision of Chertok, Rauschenbach’s team was strengthened by the aforementioned “nuclear scientists”. Did he think that the “boys” do not mind – fail the task, and the dog with them? Or was he sure that it was the young “bright minds” who were capable of solving such a difficult problem? Go ahead and know … Who will frankly write about such things in his memoirs?
The developers were “pressed” from all sides. First of all, the military. According to some reports, at the “top” the 1M project was considered not least as the next stage of testing an intercontinental missile (“Molniya”, in fact – a ballistic R-7) with a payload. Failure could lead to very unpleasant consequences for the employees of OKB-1.
The matter was complicated by the fact that for the period 1959/60 there was a change of generations in Soviet electronics. The venerable “lamp workers” urgently needed to improve their qualifications. According to the recollections of the employees of the Rauschenbach group, work on the new topic began with the words of one of the young specialists of the newly formed laboratory, physicist Vladimir Kaznacheev: “It’s okay! A semiconductor is the same lamp, only a small one. “
They had to work in two shifts – OKB-1 was put in too tight time frames. In a matter of months, it was necessary to develop a completely new technique based on a new element base. To save time (and, at the same time, space on board the spacecraft), it was decided that the on-board central computer (BCVM), together with other electronic units, would be combined into a single computing-solving unit (SRB), on the elements of which work was carried out in parallel. And – you know, they did it!
By the way, all OKB-1 worked in those days in an emergency mode. After all, an interplanetary spacecraft is not only an SRB, which is obvious. This is a huge number of components, assemblies and fine equipment. And now – the great day, October 10, 1960! Hundreds of people with sinking hearts watched the launch vehicle with six hundred and fifty kilograms of warm proletarian greetings for the Red Planet go to the zenith!
Launch of the 8K71PS rocket, which later “grew” into “Molniya”
We watched for five minutes until it became clear that the start could be recorded as “unsuccessful”. At the three hundredth second of the flight, the engines of the third stage failed. The fault of the spacecraft developers was not here – the defect in the control system of the Molniya rocket affected. Four days later, a similar fate befell the second launch vehicle. The poor build quality and maintenance of the missile also played a role.
OKB-1 was already working on a new project. Among other things, it was necessary (and again in an emergency) to develop an on-board computer for a new ambitious project – a heavy interplanetary spacecraft (TMK) weighing not hundreds of kilograms, but tens of tons. But for this, it was necessary to provide for the assembly of the spacecraft in low-earth orbit from separate blocks using, again, electronics, which was not even available in the project.
A year later, the first reports on the work carried out were already received – six considerable volumes. Of these, one separate volume is devoted to the development of on-board computers on a completely domestic technical basis using discrete elements. Among other things, it was indicated that the on-board computer should be universal, i.e. use new principles for obtaining and analyzing information, and at the same time – interaction with the crew.
Ultimately, it was decided “at the top” to abandon the construction of TMK, and to direct the best practices and the best specialists to the more promising Soyuz program. It was within the framework of this program that a new concept of centralized control of spacecraft was formulated, which was to dominate astronautics for many years. But more about this some other time …
Author: Pavel Zaikin
