A Tale of Russian Artillery. Electronic brain of artillery and what does Russian-Japanese have to do with it (1905-1991)

The development of artillery during the Cold War was so intertwined with all types of human activity that it cannot be explained in a nutshell. Now artillery is a fusion of mechanics, physics, chemistry, materials science, mechanical engineering and metalworking and, of course, electronics. And I’ll start from afar, we’ll go to distant years, when the newest Japanese battleships shot much better than the Russians.

If during the battle in the Yellow Sea our battleships had a completely normal percentage of hits, then in Tsushima the squadron, which survived sailing right through the entire ball, produced almost twice as bad shooting as the Japanese. But what was remarkable about all this was that the shooting accuracy turned out to be extremely low, and the distances from which they opened fire jumped over the 6 km mark (the battleship Asahi opened fire from 7 km, Mikasa – from 6.4 km), while the same masters of the seas, the British, tried not to shoot further than 2.5-3 km. This led to a huge consumption of ammunition (there was a looming chance that the ammo could run out in the battle) and low shooting accuracy. The Barr & Stroud FA3 rangefinders installed on the ships of the opposing squadrons were insufficient for accurate shooting at such distances, and the guns themselves were already firing at 20 km.

Russian ships, in addition to conventional rangefinders, had a Geisler fire control system (FCS), which we sometimes call a full-fledged FCS, although there was no smell of automation: in fact, it was a ship’s communication system that ensured the exchange of data between rangefinder posts, the conning tower, and the central post , guns and ammunition magazines. Something similar was built on the Japanese battleship “Asahi” by Hiroharu Kato, so in his homeland he is considered the father of the control system. In order not to shoot at the front sight (and there were guns with iron sights in our fleet), new guns began to be equipped with 8x Perepelkin sights. This whole system worked somehow; during exercises, different ships of the 2nd squadron gave a difference in measurements to the same target at a distance of 100 cables to 24 cables, i.e. error of almost ¼ distance! And the target speed was determined to be between 6 and 17.6 knots, with the actual speed being 10.

An LMS differs from all this in the presence of calculation automation tools. They began to seriously think about this problem after the battle in the Yellow Sea. In 1911, the so-called Dreyer table (or Dreyer Fire Control Table) appeared after its creator, the Englishman Frederick Charles Dreyer. He combined the receipt of information from rangefinders, from the ship's crew, anemometer, gyrocompass, log, weather vane on one device (the same table) to process all this on a Dreyer mechanical calculator (not in honor of Frederick, but John, his brother). When the newest battleships were equipped with these devices, the artillery officers breathed a sigh of relief, in their words: “The Dreyer table gave us freedom from endless calculations.”. The British showed this at Jutland, reducing the battle with the well-trained Germans to a draw after an epic team fight of battlecruisers.

And the United States jumped into this race with both legs. At first, elements of the control system were installed on 305-mm dreadnoughts, and with some modifications – on 356-mm. In 1916, Ford's first electromechanical computer (not a calculator!) appeared, which continuously processed incoming data and solved differential equations. Unlike the British, where the main calculations were carried out by the main artillery post in the conning tower and the fire control post on the foremast, the Americans carried out all calculations at the artillery post in the depths of the ship, which complicated communication at the technical level of WWI, but increased the survivability of the system . The United States was proud that in 2 minutes from 18 km, a division of ships could achieve 19 hits. But, as joint shooting with the British in 1918 showed, the overseas fire control system was more complex and produced worse performance. It also turned out that the temperature of the charge greatly affects the shooting: on battleships, the charges passed next to the steam pipeline, which is why they became very hot. After isolating the powder supply, the accuracy improved by almost 2 times! In general, in 1918 the United States absorbed both its own experience and the experience of the British.

And so it went on and on. In the 20s – 30s, during modernization, battleships with 356-mm broadheads began to be equipped with the new Guns Fire Control System Mk.2. This was the world's first system where instruments located in different parts of the ship were integrated into a data exchange system. Computers provided vertical and horizontal guidance data taking into account headings, ship and target speeds, temperature, wind, etc., down to the degree of wear of each individual barrel. Gradually, anti-mine caliber guns and anti-aircraft weapons began to be equipped with automation. In 1938, the system included the XAF radar on the New York and the CXZ on the Texas, which transmitted data on the air situation, and later SGs made it possible to fire at enemy ships in zero visibility. On the newest Iowa, the fire control system has become even better, coupled with radio-fuse projectiles, providing almost perfect protection against Japanese air raids. The pinnacle of development of artillery computers in the United States during WWII was ENIAC – the world's first full-fledged computer, created in 1943-1945. for compiling gun firing tables.

What about the USSR? During the dreadnought race, already before WWI, our ships began to lag behind in fire control; the Sevastopols carried a modified Geisler system. Even the unbuilt Izmails carried a lot of foreign components, incl. German, therefore, in ideal conditions, it would have been necessary to start catching up in the 20s, but with empty pockets and weak industry, it was not possible to build battleships, or even just modern light cruisers. During the modernization in the 30s, the Sevastopol was equipped with a Gora central aiming system for the main caliber and a Casemate for the secondary battery. They also installed devices for controlling the COM anti-aircraft guns. As WWII practice showed, these systems are seriously outdated. For example, on November 11, 1941, to knock out He. 111, “Paris Commune” spent 157 76-mm shells and 554 37-mm. On June 16, 1942, when the crew got used to it, 44 shrapnel shells were used in a standing position to shoot down the plane.

Progress was made on the Project 26 cruisers, which were equipped with the Molniya control system and the MPUAZO (naval anti-aircraft artillery fire control device) Horizon. The latter included a mechanical computer SO-26. Much in the design and production technology was learned from the Americans (in the same Horizon, the Lawn gyrovertical was copied from Sperry instruments) and Italians, and German Anschütz instruments were used for the MPUAZO of battleships. At the same time, the Mina-7 launcher for the 130-mm artillery of destroyers and TAS torpedo firing devices appeared. But it was not possible to bring everything to fruition quickly; they completed it already during the war years, adding Lend-Lease equipment (for example, radar). The first computers TsAS-2 and TsAS-1 received from industry turned out to be approximately at the level of the Italian, not the best in the 30s.

But much closer to the theme of the cycle is the appearance of PUAZO among ground anti-aircraft gunners before the war. It was developed from 1930 to 1932. at the Artillery Academy named after. Dzerzhinsky (now the Academy of the Strategic Missile Forces named after Peter the Great) under the leadership of K.V. Kruse. PUAZO-1 was the simplest device, the calculations of which were made without taking into account a bunch of conditions and under the hypothesis of rectilinear uniform motion of the target. The calculations were carried out according to graphs and had a bunch of mistakes, but nevertheless, 400 devices were ordered (it is not clear how many were made). To eliminate some of the shortcomings of the first model, PUAZO-2 was made in 1934. It was distinguished by the presence of electrical synchronous transmission of calculated data from the device to the guns, which made it possible to fire at maneuvering targets and increase the density of fire.

And even PUAZO-2 was difficult to operate, gave large errors and generally became outdated due to the frantic development of aviation and the emergence of new anti-aircraft guns. To control the fire of the latter, PUAZO-3 was born in 1939 – a much more serious machine. It included a three-meter optical rangefinder, and a counting device took into account wind speed and direction, temperature and humidity. But it had a big drawback – the size of the system and the crew of 7 people. In fact, mechanical fire control systems have reached a dead end at this point – the more you need to take into account, the more people you need in the calculation and the more difficult it is to control it. But a stop in the development of death is similar, for the new 85-mm gun KS-1 mod. 1944 they made PUAZO-4A, which had installers for remote fuses of projectiles. In the late 40s – early 50s, during the further development of PUAZO, it already included joint work with radar, but still could not effectively hit modern aviation. And later such systems gave way to air defense systems with analog computers.

People started thinking about automating fire control for field artillery in the 50s, and in 1958 the development of digital computers for military and military aviation began. Considering the accuracy of the missiles of those years and the rocket mania of the leadership, the candidacy of the first test subjects was quickly sorted out. Just two years later, the Udar, Transistor and Molniya computers appeared for missile divisions. In 1962, computers VM-11 and VM-11B were accepted for OTRK, and in 1963-1964. — VM-3 and VM-3M for tactical missiles, reducing calculation time hundreds of times! During the Great Rearmament, the go-ahead was given for the creation of computers and new generation missile launch control systems. In 1972, the first CACS (complex of automated control equipment) Ruina was created specifically for the Luna-M fuel dispenser, based on the 1B510 digital computer. For Elbrus and Temp, in 1975, KAU-1 and KAU-2 were adopted for the divisional level and KAU-10 and KAU-20 for the brigade level.

Naturally, by the 80s there was a need to change these systems to something more decent. So, in 1984, the KAUO Plaid was adopted to control the OTRK, and for Tochka and Smerch – 9S729 Slepok. In particular, the 9S729M1 Slepok-1 variant allows you to control the fire of the entire 9K58 rocket brigade. This KAUO includes only one type of UKShM (universal command and staff vehicle) – MP32M1 based on KamAZ-43114. In his kung there are four automated workstations connected to a local network. With other KShM MP32M1 can maintain communication at a distance of up to 300 km in position and up to 20 in motion. Closed communication channels transmit information at speeds up to 16 kbit/s.

For now, the point is that in the 60s in the United States they began to introduce computers into the fire control system of field artillery. This significantly increased the effectiveness of shooting in Vietnam. Thanks to new computers, in the 70s, American artillery posed a greater danger than the technically more advanced European artillery. Naturally, such a challenge during the Great Rearmament in the Union could not be missed, and the development and implementation of specialized control machines began to improve the quality of artillery fire. It started on June 4, 1967 with Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 609/201. By 1973, at the Signal Research Institute, they had created the KSAUO (complex of fire control automation equipment) 1B12 Machine-S for self-propelled artillery and 1B17 Machine-B for towed and rocket artillery. They included several machines that carried out calculations, maintained communications, and carried out topographic mapping.

1B12 used the base of the latest MT-LBu at that time, partly unified with Gvozdika. Management is organized at the divisional level. The KSAUO includes 8 vehicles, of which the batteries contain the vehicle of the battery commander 1B14 and the vehicle of the senior battery officer (SOB) 1B13, in the division there is the vehicle of the division commander 1B15 and the vehicle of the chief of staff 1B16. Depending on the self-propelled guns, the fire of which was controlled by the KSAUO, the variants 1V12-1 (for 2S1 divisions), 1V12-2 (for 2S3) were first built, and in the second half of the 70s – 1V12-3 (for 2S4), 1V12-4 ( for 2S5) and 1V12-5 (for 2S7).

Commander vehicles (KMU – command control vehicle) are partly mobile command and observation posts (COP), which can conduct reconnaissance and maintain communications. For this purpose, the vehicles are equipped with surveillance devices, laser rangefinders, navigation aids, radio stations and the immortal TA-57. KShMU (command and staff control vehicle) 1V13 SOB and 1V16 chief of staff directly control the fire of the self-propelled guns. They were equipped with navigation, communications and, most interestingly, fire control devices PUO-9M and correction calculation devices PRK-75. Separately, the 1V13 had an AP artillery leveler, and the 1V16 had a 1V59 computer, 9V59 automatic command transceivers, and T-244-1 data transmission equipment. All this allowed 1V12 to solve problems:

• maintaining communication and exchanging information within the division, with a higher level in the artillery, with the combined arms command and with assigned reconnaissance forces;

• independent reconnaissance, guidance and shooting adjustments;

• linking division positions on the ground;

• formation of remote command and observation posts (COP);

• collection, processing, storage and distribution of data on the state of the division and explored targets;

• planning artillery fire, calculating the consumption of shells and methods of firing at targets, issuing individual corrections for each gun, incl. and when shooting at moving targets;

• documenting data using a computer;

• radiation and chemical reconnaissance;

• leading columns in bad weather.

As can be seen from this sheet, KSUAO solved the titanic volume of tasks facing the gunners. The preparation time for firing was reduced by 2 times, and the accuracy of fire increased by up to a third. Before the collapse of the Union, 500 1B12s were produced, which covered almost all the needs for these complexes.

The 1B17 differed from its tracked brother mainly in its chassis. The division commander's vehicles (1V19 Klen-2) and batteries (1V18 Klen-1) were located on the BTR-60PB base, and the headquarters vehicles 1V111 Alder and 1V110 Bereza were based on the ZIL-131 and GAZ-66. In terms of fire control capabilities, there were no special differences from the 1B12, but it was cheaper, because it all went to simple motorized rifle units, and not to the tank elite of the Soviet Army. But, unlike its older brother, the production of Machine-B was more modest – only about 300 complexes, which is why a bunch of divisions in the rear districts were gigantic like in the good old days.

Naturally, the CSAUOs were modernized. In the 80s, with the advent of modernized self-propelled guns such as 2S3M1 and 2S7M and the development of electronics, new complexes 1V12M Falset and 1V17-1 appeared. In particular, 1V520 ballistic computers began to be installed on command vehicles, and 1V510 Core computers were installed on staff vehicles, which were much better at processing weather conditions and calculating rectangular coordinates. The new self-propelled guns were equipped with 1V514 Mechanizator equipment to exchange information with the KSAUO. And the vehicles from 1V12M/1V17-1 were equipped with target illumination equipment, which indicated bad guys to the latest guided munitions such as Krasnopol. At the same time, the Airborne Forces began to receive 1B119 Rheostat – the same filling, but on a landing chassis. In 1989, even more advanced second-generation complexes 1V12M-1 Funicular-S and 1V17-1M Funicular-B were developed, but, again, due to the collapse of the country they did not go into production.

Everything would be fine, but in the 80s TACFIRE appeared in the USA, and Atila appeared in France. They had advanced electronics and could issue a command to a new target in 25 and 35 seconds, respectively, while the 1V12M needed to spend 240-300 seconds! Meanwhile, these updated complexes have not supplanted their predecessors. To be fair, it is worth noting that ours still had the advantage of high mobility of the CCMU (command control vehicle complex), a large number of side benefits, and the ability to begin work soon after arriving at the place, rather than deploying in ideal conditions for at least half an hour at the place of arrival.

In addition to the experienced Funicular, in the 80s the 1V126 Kapustnik-B was developed, capable of controlling everything up to a brigade consisting of any guns, mortars or MLRS then available in the USSR. In particular, the Msta-S divisions were equipped with this KSAUO. Data exchange within the complex, between guns, command posts and reconnaissance took place in real time. The Kapustnik includes: KNP (command and observation vehicle) 1V152 and KShM 1V153. As you can see, there is a simplification. Automated data exchange occurs over a distance of up to 30 km. In terms of performance, 1V126 and 1V12M-1/1V17-1M should be brought closer to TACFIRE (30 seconds for issuing data to open fire on a new target). But… They were able to bring Kapustnik to mind only in the 00s. It is difficult to say what state the work on it was in in 1991.

But above all these systems there was another superstructure – an automated troop control system (ATCS). They were created both for large homogeneous formations and associations (for example, a missile division), and for combined arms groupings. In 1961, work began on the first of them: Research and Development Directorate for the battalion-front link (the most logical name) and Research and Development Delta specifically for rocket and artillerymen. It was not possible to achieve any outstanding result on the existing base, therefore already in 1964 they began to make a much more well-known system for the front army-division levels Maneuver, which was tormented until 1982. Customers, performers, requirements, machines, electronic database changed etc. It was not possible to equip all the troops with it, especially since with a new elemental base it was necessary to modernize it, which was done by 1988. In fact, the maneuver was completed in 1991, a few months before the collapse of the country.

The Maneuver included an automated missile and military control system, which, as is clear from the abbreviation, controlled the actions of artillery in formations and interacted with other troops. The KShM worked in it on the Ulan computer. It consisted of several subsystems: Viscose (for controlling the OTRK), Batya (artillery reconnaissance at the tactical level), Vivarium (for controlling the MLRS), Unifier (for cannon artillery) and the already mentioned Slepok-M. They included: KShM MP24R (MP24M) for the highest level of command, central electronic computing complexes (ECC) MP95 Beta-3M, actually servers in our understanding, control points for automation and communications equipment (PUSAS) MP24 (MP21M) for administration and management network.

On the calendar, it’s already 1991, before the collapse of the USSR, the unified army and all these automated systems, the count has already begun for weeks, and the tests are just being completed by the Manevr-TM automated control system. For it, the CSAU Unifier for artillery brigades and regiments was developed (which I wrote about above). It included: the commander's vehicle MP24R-2, the chief of staff vehicle MP32 (MP24R-3) and the artillery reconnaissance control center vehicle MP32 (MP24R-4). But the real point was that all these systems, contrary to the name, were developed… separately from the existing KSAUO battery-division and therefore cannon and rocket artillery, except for Smerch, would have worked as if in an information vacuum, had the Soviet Union introduced Maneuver en masse into the troops.

Actually, despite a lot of effort expended, the Soviet automation of artillery control was not destined to fire. In Afghanistan, it turned out that the early 1B12 and 1B17 that arrived there were unsuitable for combat in the mountains and for countering militants. After the collapse of the USSR, the most complex automated control systems began to quickly degrade, and Machines-S and -B again went to the mountainous Chechnya. Once again, as at Stalingrad, the artillerymen had to run around with a compass and binoculars on their own feet and give guidance as in the famous film: “Tube 20, sight 120!”

The notorious TACFIRE, included in the combined arms networks and modernized by Desert Storm, turned out to be unattainable for us due to the latest electronic base. Thus, up to 1,428 target forms could be loaded into the American’s memory, 200 into the Beta-3M computer, and only 50 into the simpler KShM computer. The speed of the Ulan computer was 4.8 times inferior to the HP 330. The design of the ASUV computer did not allow maneuver update software, carry out labor-intensive work on document flow and operational-tactical calculations. Our printers could output up to 30 characters per second versus 250 for the American, and the display of information on maps gave errors of 50-100 meters.

Author: Alexey Borzenkov

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